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Abstract—Security Analysts that work in a ‘Security Opera-
tions Center’ (SoC) play a major role in ensuring the security
of the organization. The amount of background knowledge they
have about the evolving and new attacks makes a significant
difference in their ability to detect attacks. Open source threat
intelligence sources, like text descriptions about cyber-attacks,
can be stored in a structured fashion in a cybersecurity knowl-
edge graph. A cybersecurity knowledge graph can be paramount
in aiding a security analyst to detect cyber threats because it
stores a vast range of cyber threat information in the form
of semantic triples which can be queried. A semantic triple
contains two cybersecurity entities with a relationship between
them. In this work, we propose a system to create semantic
triples over cybersecurity text, using deep learning approaches
to extract possible relationships. We use the set of semantic
triples generated through our system to assert in a cybersecurity
knowledge graph. Security Analysts can retrieve this data from
the knowledge graph, and use this information to form a decision
about a cyber-attack.
Index Terms—cybersecurity, deep learning, knowledge graphs
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber-attacks aim to compromise the confidentiality, in-
tegrity, and availability of information. These attacks target
individuals, small and medium enterprises. Today attacks
such as a denial of services, malicious codes executed via a
backdoor or trapdoors, malware, trojans are some of the most
common attack types [2]. Every year researchers and cyber
defense professionals find millions of attack and malware
variants in the wild [6].
Now a ‘Security Analysts’ working in a ‘Security Opera-
tions Center’ (SoC) needs to keep up with variants of cyber
threat intelligence that’s available online so as to secure their
organization. These analysts need to process this information
keeping in mind their local defensive setup.
Knowledge about cyber-attacks and malwares specifically
their means, target, etc. is available in the ‘wild’ as cyber
threat intelligence. It is possible to develop a cyber informatics
pipeline which scours the web for threat intelligence, extracts
and mines knowledge from these intelligence samples and
represents them as a scheme fit for Security information and
event management (SIEM) systems.
Threat intelligence sources are generally of two types,
covert and overt. Overt or ‘open source intelligence’ (OSINT)
is available through various sources like, cybersecurity blogs,
cybersecurity reports, CVE [21], CWE [22], National Vul-
nerability Datasets [28], and any cybersecurity text publicly
available. Various SIEM systems, fetch, process, and store
much of the cyber threat intelligence available through OSINT
sources. Knowledge Graphs (KG) specifically to store cyber
threat intelligence has been used by many cybersecurity in-
formatics systems. These cybersecurity knowledge graphs can
not only store but are also be able to retrieve data and answer
complex queries asked by the security analysts.
The dependence of various cybersecurity informatics sys-
tems on various knowledge representation schemes makes
it imperative that we develop systems that improve these
representations. Some examples are the Intrusion Detection
System Knowledge Graphs proposed by Undercoffer et al. [35]
and Unified Cybersecurity Ontology (UCO) [34]. In case of a
cybersecurity knowledge graph, this boils down to improving
the quality of semantic triples generated from various cyber
threat intelligence sources. An ontology can be used to provide
a system with base cybersecurity classes and the relations that
exist between them.
Semantic triple generation is a key component in the Knowl-
edge Graph population(See Section II). A semantic triple for
cybersecurity comprises of a pair of cybersecurity entities and
a relationship between the entities. A cybersecurity entity can
be a word or a group of words extracted from cybersecurity
text. Generally, a Named Entity Recognizer (NER) is used to
extract entities that form the base knowledge graph. Multiple
such cybersecurity domain specific named entity recognizer
currently exist [4][16][18][26][15][33][29].
The next step in cybersecurity knowledge graph creation is,
predicting the right relationship between two specific entities
extracted from a specific cyber threat intelligence source. As
soon as we figure out the various relationships and entities,
we can assert the semantic triple set in a knowledge graph.
In this paper, we propose the RelExt system that strives
to improve various cyber threat representation schemes, espe-
cially cybersecurity knowledge graphs (CKG) by predicting
relations between cybersecurity entities identified by cyberse-
curity named entity recognizer. These representation systems
have been used to build various ‘Analyst Augmentation Sys-
tems’ that aid a security analyst. These augmentation systems
help keep an analyst working in an SoC environment updated
about various developments in the wild that can impact the se-
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curity of her organization. We believe that improving the base
cyber threat intelligence representation will help improve the
overall quality and performance of these analyst augmentation
systems.
RelExt is a feed-forward neural network model that predicts
relationships between cybersecurity entities, that form up a
triple. Existing models use features such as length of entities
involved, words between the entities as features for the model.
We leverage the contextual similarity between the entities to
find out if the entities would make up a triple. In RelExt, we
use contextual vector representation of cybersecurity entities
identified by a cybersecurity specific NER.
The rest of the paper has been organized as follows -
Section II discusses some related work. Section III talks about
building an ontology for our Cybersecurity Knowledge Graph.
We introduce the RelExt system in Section IV. Section V talks
about the evaluation metrics. We conclude the paper in section
VI.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Knowledge Graphs for cybersecurity
Data management and exploration were for long sup-
ported by either keyword-based search technology or various
stochastic matching approaches [30]. Content and knowledge-
based approach in contrast to the former approach, add a
layer of sophistication. Often termed as the specification of
a conceptualization, Ontology forms the exclusive way to
represent and communicate facts and relations with multiple
agents [12]. Ontology is a set of classes with attributes and
relationships between instances of various classes. One of the
earliest available ontology for the cybersecurity, which was
built as an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) was introduced
by Undercoffer et al. [35]. Unified Cybersecurity Ontology, an
extension of the IDS ontology, built by Syed et al. [34] is a
more cybersecurity domain focused ontology based on STIX
1.2 [10]. We in this paper, extend some of the concepts from
UCO 1.0, like various classes and relationships. Yan Jia et
al. [15] discuss knowledge graph population approaches for
the cybersecurity domain. The authors use various machine
learning approaches to extract entities of interest from the
cybersecurity domain. Relationships are then predicted be-
tween these entities by calculating formulas and path ranking
algorithms. CyberTwitter [24] and Cyber-All-Intel [25] are
other systems that create a cybersecurity knowledge graph.
Knowledge graphs consist of semantic triples which have
a subject, predicate, and an object. A predicate is a rela-
tionship between the subject and the object. The semantic
triple generation would thus require a relationship extractor.
Alternatively, an existing knowledge graph is improved by
looking for more relationships, or links, between entities,
nodes, already available in the knowledge graph. Our paper
concentrates on developing RelExt, which uses a feed forward
neural network to predict relationships between subject-object
entity pairs and subsequently improve the knowledge graph
population.
B. Relationship Extraction
Relationships connect two entities found to be interest-
ing by the system. Relationships could be symmetrical or
asymmetrical. Entities can also end up with no relation to
each other, depending upon the underlying ontology. Rela-
tionship extractors always end up with a lack of sufficient
data to be trained with. Defining the relation might seem
to be a straightforward task, but applying a relationship for
two entities is an ambiguous task. Often, a difference of
opinions and perspective to what a relationship means, end up
with higher inner-annotation disagreement [32]. Based on the
approach, relation extraction can be classified as global level or
mention level relation extraction [32]. Mention level extraction
expects a pair of entities to find a relationship for. Whereas,
global level extraction only expects the corpus and ends up
listing entities with the relationship. Relationship extractors
can be either binary or n-ary classifiers. Binary classifiers try
to predict whether a specific relation R holds between two
entities. Whereas n-ary classifiers try to predict whether two
entities hold one of the relationships from the predefined set
[27].
Relation extraction can be classified down to three ap-
proaches, supervised, semi-supervised, and unsupervised. Su-
pervised approaches are explored by Kambhatla et al. [17] and
Zhao et al. [39]. Some of the well known semi-supervised
approaches include the DIPRE system introducted by Brin
[5], Snowball [1], and Knowitall [7]. Hasegawa [13] proposed
one of the earliest approach for unsupervised clustering for
relationship extraction. Knowitall is extended well to incorpo-
rate an unsupervised approach for relationship extraction by
Rosenfeld et al. [31].
C. Knowledge Graph Improvement
Relation prediction or extraction is one elegant way to fill
in missing links between entities of interests in a knowledge
graph. A simple link prediction would not suffice this task,
as nodes in KG carry the certain identity and the edges mean
a certain connection between the identities [19]. Moreover,
we need to know if a relationship exists between pairs of
entities along with the type of relationship. Relationships
between two entities, or between pair of the group of entities,
can be classified based on their complexity and number
of entities mapped. TransE [3] model predicts one-to-one
relationships [38] based on the vector space for head and
tail entities. TransH model, an improvement over TransE
[38], based over translating vectors on hyperplane [38] works
on predicting many-to-many relationships. The TranSparse
model uses sparse matrices to address the heterogenity and
imbalance of knowledge graph which was missed out by
TransE, TransH, TransR, and TransD models [14]. Our model,
RelExt, is trained over vectors, specifically in the domain
of cybersecurity, to extract relationships between pairs of
cybersecurity entities.
III. CYBERSECURITY KNOWLEDGE GRAPH
A use-case of our system is to aid in the development of a
cybersecurity knowledge graph (CKG). A CKG generally has
two main parts, a schema and various cybersecurity-related
semantic triples. In order to build a CKG, the first thing we
need to do is to define a schema. Next, we use our system to
extract relationships between cybersecurity entities, which are
words or groups of words, extracted from cybersecurity text.
Once we have the entity-relationship set, we can populate the
data consistent with the schema.
Syed et al. in their paper [34] have developed an ontology
for cybersecurity called Unified Cybersecurity Ontology (UCO
1.0). Their paper describes a prototype version of an ontology
which encompasses various cybersecurity elements. The paper
provided us with a starting point for the development of our
system, as it mentions some classes and probable relationships
that could exist between various classes.
Members of our research group have worked previously on
creating cybersecurity knowledge graph from different open
source intelligence (OSINT) sources [24], [25]. In this paper,
we create a system ‘RelExt’ that improves such knowledge
graphs by predicting relations between various cybersecurity
entities, as they occur in the text. RelExt (See Section IV)
leverages a deep neural net to automatically extract various
relationships between pairs of entities to improve our CKG.
Defining entities and relationships in a cybersecurity on-
tology are paramount for building a CKG. We use the class
definitions proposed by UCO [34] to define our entities of
interest. The class definitions and the relationship definition
present in UCO 1.0 were based on Structured Threat In-
formation eXpression (STIX) 1.2. We use the relationships
and classes defined by the Structured Threat Information
eXpression (STIX) 2.0 to update UCO 1.0 and create UCO
2.0. [9]. Figure 1, provides an overview of the relationships
between various entity types as defined in STIX 2.0.
A. Classes in UCO 2.0
Here we explain some important classes that are present in
UCO 2.0:
• Software : An entity that relates to a piece of code usually
used as tool such as Office or Unix operating system.
• Malware : An entity that refers to malicious code and/or
software which is inserted into a system.
• Indicator : An entity that contains a pattern which helps
the administrator to indicate an ongoing attack or mali-
cious activity.
• Vulnerability : An entity that refers to a patch of bug or
weakness that could be exploited by ill-intended users.
• Course-of-action : An entity that refers an action or set
of actions that either prevents or responds to an attack.
• Tool : An entity that refers to a legitimate software that
can be used by threat actors for malicious activities.
• Attack-pattern : An entity that refers to steps that could
result in an active attack on an individual or group of
users.
Fig. 1: Relationships and some classes defined in Structured
Threat Information eXpression (STIX) 2.0 architecture [9].
• Campaign : An entity that refers to grouping of activities
that could lead to a malicious attack.
B. Relationships in UCO 2.0
In UCO 2.0 we have defined the following relationship,
based on the STIX 2.0 definitions [9].
• hasProduct : Relationship where the subject and object
entities, or just the object entity belong to software class.
• hasVulnerability : Relationship where the subject entity
belongs to a software class and object entity belongs to
a vulnerability class.
• mitigates : Relationship where the subject entity belongs
to a course-of-action class and object entity belongs to
malware or campaign class, wherein the subject entity
aims to lessen the damages caused by object entity.
• uses : Relationship where the subject entity belongs to a
campaign or malware class and object entity belongs to
a tool or software class, wherein subject entity aims to
leverage object entity to carry on an attack.
• indicates : Relationship where the subject entity belongs
to a indicator class and object entity belongs to a mal-
ware or campaign class, wherein indicates. demonstrates
presence or after effects of a object entity
• attributed-to : Relationship where the subject entity be-
longs to campaign or intrusion-set class and object entity
belongs to threat actor class wherein subject entity is
attributed to object entity.
• related-to : Relationship wherein subject entity and object
entity are related to each other.
• located-at : Relationship where entities are inter depen-
dent or become a part of.
Fig. 2: Missing Relationships: The diagram on the left
depicts how a particular relationship is not asserted in the
existing knowledge graph. The one on the right shows, the
relationship asserted by RelExt.
C. Baseline Knowledge Graph and missing relationships
In existing cybersecurity knowledge graph systems (See
Section II-A) the resulting knowledge graph can be improved.
A knowledge graph can have incorrect relationships between
two cybersecurity entities, or may not even assert a relation-
ship. In such a case, we can say that there are a few ‘missing’
relationships. Our system RelExt improves such knowledge
graphs by validating relationships and asserting values for
missing relationships.
For example, in Figure 2(a), there is a relationship which
is not found by existing methods, hence we can say that this
relationship is ‘missing’ from the knowledge graph. Figure
2(b), shows how RelExt can automatically suggest a value for
the missing relationship.
IV. RELEXT: SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we introduce our RelExt system, which
extracts relationships between two named entities. The input to
RelExt is a pair of named entities extracted from a particular
cybersecurity text. RelExt outputs an entity relationship set.
We use a Named Entity Recognizer (NER) to extract cyber-
security entities from a piece of cybersecurity text. This NER
was created and used in the CyberTwitter system [24]. The
NER outputs a key-value pair, where the key is a cybersecurity
entity and the value is a class as defined in UCO 2.0. A pair
of such named entities serve as the input to RelExt.
RelExt’s input can be further processed based on our cyber-
security knowledge graph’s schema. This allows us to remove
some entity pairs which are not consistent with UCO 2.0 and
STIX 2.0. For example, we do not provide the relationship
extractor with an input where the entity pairs are of the type
Campaign and Version, because our schema suggests there
should be no relationship between them. We also remove
pairs of entities which are not in close proximity to one
another in the pre-processing stage as explained in Figure 4.
We have chosen a threshold of 35 words, which is used as a
window-size limit. Two entities have to be within a window
of 35 words, to be sent to the RelExt system for relationship
prediction. We found that the average sentence length in the
corpus was 14 words. We keep the window length as a function
of the average length of sentences. We empirically chose 35
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Fig. 4: The pair of entities connected by the red line (mRAT,
accessing sensitive information) is not provided as an input
to RelExt as they are not in close proximity. The pair
connected by green (xRAT, accessing sensitive information),
however, is preserved.
as the threshold for proximity. Having said that, this number
is a heuristic, and it is open to experimentation. Users, of this
system, can tune this parameter, depending upon their demand
for precision and recall.
Once, we get the processed list of credible entity pairs, we
can generate vector embeddings of these entities. We have
another neural model, Word2Vec [20], which is trained on
a cybersecurity corpus, which takes any particular word and
then converts that word into a vector of fixed dimensions.
We take two vectors, one for each entity, and provide them
as an input to RelExt, which is a Feed-Forward Neural
Network (FFNN) classifier. RelExt then predicts one out of
the candidate relationships which we have assumed to exist
between the named entity pairs from UCO.
The model (See Figure 3) has 3 hidden layers along with
input and output layers. Hidden layers form the fully con-
nected layers. Input layer accepts two entities in their vector
representations. The neural model accepts the two resulting
vectors of dimension 200.
These vector embeddings are concatenated at the initial
layer. The concatenated embeddings are propagated to the
hidden layers. Hidden layers are non-linearly activated using
the sigmoid function. Weights and biases are learned through
training the neural model. The three hidden layers with 200,
100, 50 neurons respectively. The output is generated using a
softmax layer.
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Fig. 5: A cybersecurity document is processed by the NER. NER extracts the entities based on classes defined in UCO 2.0.
Further, the vector representations of the entities are generated using a Word2Vec model. A preprocessed set of entity pairs
act as input for the RelExt. Based on the relationships predicted for the entities by RelExt, we assert it in the Cybersecurity
Knowledge Graph (CKG).
1) Updating the CKG: The output of RelExt is a relation-
ship set for every pair of entities which are provided as input to
the model. So, for every pair of extracted entities from the cy-
bersecurity text, we predict a relationship, from the candidate
relationships. We take this entity-relationship set and assert
it in our cybersecurity knowledge graph. As an example, in
Figure 6, we showcase a part of our cybersecurity knowledge
graph using a tool called Protege [8]. The asserted knowledge
graph contains information captured from multiple sources.
The example shows description of two malware attacks, Dark
Caracal and crossRAT. We can see all the classes like Vul-
nerability, Course-of-Action, etc. and the individual entities
of the classes which were found in the description. We also
see the relationships asserted between the entity pairs, which
are represented as lines connecting these entities. E.g., ’Wi-Fi
Access Points’ is a Tool which is used by ’xRAT’ Malware. We
can capture other information related to Softwares mentioned
in the cybersecurity text. For example, we see Software ‘Adobe
Flash Player’ hasVulnerability Vulnerability ‘sensitive data’.
We can also capture other information about the software,
such as the other softwares ‘Adobe Flash Player’, in turn,
uses. We can see Software ‘Java SQL Date’ is being used
by ‘Adobe Flash Player’. We also see information about the
exploit-targets for respective malwares. We see ‘Whatsapp’ as
an exploit-target which hasVulnerability ‘phishing messages’.
‘Windows OSX’, ‘PCs and mobile devices’ are other exploit-
targets asserted in the knowledge graph, which are affected
by the ‘xRAT’ Malware. Exploiting ‘PCs and mobile devices’
can be seen as a part of a campaign ‘multi-platform espionage
campaign’. The information presented in the knowledge graph
is useful in deriving similarities between two malware attacks.
We can infer that both ‘Dark Caracal’ and ‘xRAT’ use Tool
‘Java’. Further information about which Tools ‘Dark Caracal’
uses is also asserted in the knowledge graph. ‘Pallas’ is another
Tool, used by ‘Dark Caracal’.
V. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP AND EVALUATIONS
In this section, we first describe our corpus and experimental
setup. We then evaluate our RelExt system.
A. Cybersecurity Corpus
Our proposed system aims to find relations between cyber-
security entities. We construct our corpus from publicly avail-
able cybersecurity text. We have extracted information from
cybersecurity bulletins, social media, National Vulnerability
Fig. 6: Asserted Knowledge Graph with relations added using our RelExt system.
Datasets. Along with these publicly available information
sources, we also collect detailed technical reports authored
by cybersecurity specialists. Figure 4, is an extract from one
of these technical reports.
However, sometimes this content is not available in raw
text. The foremost action would be extracting raw text from
these documents/reports. We have used open source libraries
available on the internet to extract raw text from HTML, PDF,
JSON, XML sources.
We next describe our training set:
• Cybersecurity blogs, cybersecurity technical reports, are
publicly available for use over the internet. We procured
about 2 GigaBytes of data from publicly available. The
data had about 474 detailed technical reports and blogs.
The reports have detailed analysis of what security an-
alysts and researchers have learned after studying an
attack. Since they are very detailed and size-able reports,
they provide us with a large number of relationships that
exist between various cybersecurity entities. They are also
structurally quite different from one another, as opposed
to smaller pieces of cybersecurity texts like Common
Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE), tweets, etc. This
gives us an opportunity to build a generalized model.
Having a diverse corpus will help the system to avoid
bias.
• Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) Corpus:
CVE JSON feeds have a textual description of the vulner-
ability present in a product. We collected approximately
90,000 JSON entities which are updated in the National
Vulnerability Dataset [21].
Splits Accuracy
80-20 96.21%
70-30 91.88%
66-34 91.34%
TABLE I: Accuracy for various splits on training and testing
data.
Relationship Classes Precision Recall F-1 Score
hasProduct 49 97 65
hasVulnerability 92 74 82
uses 100 88 93
indicates 80 90 85
mitigates 55 70 62
related-to 92 74 66
TABLE II: Precision, Recall, and F-1 score for relationship
classes.
• Microsoft and Adobe Security Bulletins: Microsoft and
Adobe release security flaws and vulnerabilities in their
respective software in the form of bulletins. Since these
are publicly available and these two companies have
produced applications which are ubiquitous, knowledge
about them is valuable while detecting an attack. Thus,
we also use them in our training set for relationship
extraction.
We can extract information such as Software entities
that would help us build the hasProduct relationship.
Moreover, we can also process the problems possessed
by the product or a specific version of the product.
The problem description contains information about the
weaknesses or vulnerabilities known for the product.
This information is sometimes represented by Common
Document Entity Pairs Relations Predicted
Dark Caracal 1287 1127
CrossRat 123 109
TABLE III: Number of Relationships predicted from the
malware descriptions of Dark Caracal and CrossRAT
malwares.
Relationship Classes Predicted
hasProduct 340
hasVulnerability 93
uses 307
TABLE IV: Various relationship classes found in Dark
Caracal and CrossRat malware descriptions.
Weakness Enumeration (CWE) IDs [22]. We have also
processed the CWE-IDs made available by MITRE [23].
Whenever a CWE-ID is met, we try to get a description
of the CWE-ID. Problem description ends up being the
Vulnerability entities. These entities could form up a
hasVulnerability relationship with Software entities.
• STIX Corpus: We also train our relationship extraction
model with the semantic triples generated using the
information from Trusted Automated eXchange of In-
dicator Information (TAXII) [11] servers. These triples
are extracted in the source, relation, target format and
processed.
Next we use this corpus to generate our Feed Forward
Neural Network based RelExt system and evaluate it.
B. Evaluations
We train RelExt with relationships from the aforemen-
tioned corpus. Along with manually annotated relationships
by cybersecurity experts and relationships that were extracted
from the corpus, we have a training set that contains 33,000
relationships. The vector representations are generated using
a pre-trained Word2Vec model, over our cybersecurity corpus.
The training set is iterated over in a batch size of 100 with
50 epochs. Each element of the batch is a pair of vectors for
subject and object entity.
We perform training with various splits like: 80-20, 70-30,
and 66-34 and the accuracy metrics for these splits have been
presented in Table I. Table II shows the precision and recall
values for various relationship classes.
Figure 5, represents the cybersecurity pipeline. Dark Caracal
and CrossRat malware descriptions are provided as input to the
pipeline. The resulting knowledge graph is shown in Figure
6 and more details about the resulting knowledge graph have
been discussed in Section IV-1.
We have 1287 pairs of entities from Dark Caracal malware
description and 123 pairs from CrossRat malware description
after filtering out the rest of entity pairs by methods mentioned
in section IV. Table III describes the relationships predicted
by RelExt from the preprocessed input. Whereas, Table IV
shows various classes of relationships predicted for the Dark
Caracal and CrossRat malware descriptions.
VI. CONCLUSION
Cybersecurity Knowledge Graphs (CKG) are useful for
storing a large number of semantic triples about cybersecurity
entities. When we take an entity relationship set extracted by
RelExt and assert it in a knowledge graph, we get access to
significant information about various cybersecurity entities.
One such example is the use of Query Languages like
SPARQL [36] or SWRL [37] to write queries which can be
used to infer information about entities present in a knowl-
edge graph. For example, we can use query languages, like
SPARQL to ask the following question: What software have
exposed vulnerabilities?
SELECT ?x WHERE {
?x :type :SOFTWARE.
?y :type :VULNERABILITY.
?x :hasVulnerability ?y.}
The above query will return ’Adobe Flash Player’ as an
answer.
In this paper, we develop the RelExt system that aids in the
prediction of relationships between entity-pairs, using a neural
network, specifically for cybersecurity. We describe a detailed
pipeline, about how we prepare the corpus of cybersecurity
texts, and process it further to provide as an input to our RelExt
system. The preprocessing step removes entities which are not
in proximity of each other as they occur in the cybersecurity
text, or they cannot have a meaningful relationship between
them. This removes a significant number of candidate semantic
triples which are incorrect according to the STIX 2.0 schema.
After training is complete, and our RelExt system has learned
how to predict a relationship between pairs of entities, we use
it to predict relationships from cybersecurity entities scraped
from unseen cybersecurity text. This gives us a triple set for
cybersecurity which can be asserted in a knowledge graph.
The RelExt system can be used to aid in the development of
an entity-relationship set specifically for cybersecurity, which
can then be asserted in a cybersecurity knowledge graph. We
achieved an accuracy of 96.61 % over various data splits.
RelExt successfully predicted over 700 relationships from
Dark Caracal and CrossRat malware descriptions.
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